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 Problems and Implications 
Canada’s Foreign Policy Dilemmas 
Canada plays little part in Europe’s Atlantic policy. 
And yet European and German policy makers should 
be aware of an emerging debate in the Northern part 
of North America that could affect Canada’s link to 
Europe and with it European interests.  
Europeans as yet are not very conscious of the fact 
that reliable, like-minded, multilateralist partners 
with enough resources and political will to make a 
contribution, do not come in such numbers that 
Canada can be largely ignored. And yet, this is still 
the predominant pattern in German as in the foreign 
policy of the European Union (EU). 
Canada is neither the US nor an aspiring EU mem-
ber, so it does not readily fit in any great scheme to 
strengthen the European identity or to re-calibre 
the transatlantic relationship. Because of real and 
acknowledged similarities between Canada and 
Europe on many foreign and domestic policy issues, 
Canada has sometimes been referred to as “a North 
American country with European instincts.” But that 
does not mean that, in comparison to the US, the 
transatlantic cooperation between Canada and Europe 
is less problematic and goes on unnurtured. Years of 
very significant Canadian involvement in the Balkans 
and major contributions in Afghanistan alongside 
European troops have not been enough to make Euro-
peans aware of the need to address the unique situa-
tion of Canada, for instance in NATO. The question, 
therefore, is why should either side do what it does 
not seem naturally inclined to do, i.e. defend and 
promote a special relationship. 
Canadians who do not share the view that Canada’s 
future lies in ever growing North American integra-
tion have the duty to ensure that Canada’s ties to the 
rest of the world remain strong. The momentum 
now is behind the development of new relations with 
emerging countries. It is again incumbent upon those 
who believe that the link to Europe is not only part of 
history to preserve it. It should be seen as being part 
of any game plan to make a difference in the world. 
President Bush has clearly acknowledged that during 
his visit to Europe last February. Canadians should 
not be lagging behind. 
The most obvious first step would be a better inclu-
sion of Canada in the transatlantic dialogue. For that 
to happen, Canada would have to define convincingly 
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the nature of its added value. It would also have to 
find within Europe a champion. As a new government 
in Germany is beginning to define its international 
role in terms of security, energy, and transatlantic 
relations, this is an aspect that it could do well to con-
sider. 
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Canada’s Dilemmas 
 
Canada always faced the same defining dilemmas in 
its foreign policy and these can be summarized as 
follows: 
 How to be both close enough and far enough from 
the United States? 
 How to have both a values-driven and an interests-
driven foreign policy? 
 How to ensure that Canada’s influence in the 
world and its influence in Washington grow 
together rather than be mutually exclusive? 
A number of major trends, both external and internal, 
combine to make these dilemmas even more acute. 
External Trends 
The Erosion of the Multilateral System 
Canadians have been the quintessential multilateral-
ists. Canada always relied heavily on its membership 
in every club to ensure high visibility, at a relatively 
low cost. It is in the unique position of belonging, 
quite legitimately, to both the Commonwealth and 
La Francophonie as well as to the Organization of 
American States (OAS), to the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), and to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). It derived from that perhaps a 
false sense of security against relative geographic 
isolation in the world and political domination on 
the North American continent. 
But today all multilateral institutions suffer, to 
varying degrees, from similar problems. They were all 
conceived at a time when the world was both smaller 
and simpler. Their adaptation to the world of today 
has been by and large unsatisfactory, due in large part 
to the fact that the objectives of greater efficiency and 
greater representativeness are not easily reconciled. 
The pace of reform has been too slow, sometimes 
because of a lack of leadership on the part of the Secre-
tary-Generals but mostly because the Member States 
tend to be more focussed on the protection of their 
own interests than they are on institutional reform. 
The result is a multilateral machinery threatened 
with partial or total paralysis. 
Today in Asia, the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) is seen as a far more relevant forum 
than APEC. In South America, Mercosur more relevant 
than the OAS, and in Europe it is the EU, despite all 
its difficulties, that is on the rise, not NATO. Even 
in Africa, it is quite clear that the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) is seen by the Africans as more 
relevant to their interests than either the Common-
wealth or La Francophonie. In all these regions, coun-
tries want to strengthen their own regional institu-
tions and tend to move away from broader structures 
which include outside players like Canada (and the 
US in the case of the OAS, APEC, and NATO). 
All this can be read perhaps as a regional response 
to globalisation; a compelling need to relate to, and 
identify with a closer, more homogeneous commu-
nity. The impact on Canada is obvious. The country 
does not quite belong everywhere the way it used to. 
This regionalisation is also having a clear impact 
on the multilateral system. Strong regional leaders 
want to have more of a say, hence their quest for a 
permanent seat on the Security Council. The kind 
of re-balancing they are seeking in the multilateral 
system is not unlike the kind of re-balancing that 
some Europeans are seeking in NATO. Some seem to 
think that after the American hegemony and before 
the Chinese one, there may be time for a kind of 
multipolar interlude! 
The current American attitude towards the multi-
lateral system, which can be described as ambivalent 
at best, is also part of the Canadian problem. US hos-
tility to the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines and to the 
creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was 
not enough to stop the process but it made a country 
like Canada realize that there were new limitations on 
what it can hope to achieve multilaterally. 
A Different Neighbour to the South 
The America that emerged from the end of the cold 
war is quite different from the one Canada was used to 
dealing with. As the only, unchallenged super-power, 
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8 
the United States have a new vision of the role they 
want to play in the world and new means to pursue it. 
September 11 has also brought about some funda-
mental changes. More than anything else, Canadians 
fear what fear might lead the United States to do. For 
a country that does 85 per cent of its external trade 
with the US, a closing of the border is of course the 
greatest concern. Addressing the security concerns of 
its neighbour has become an imperative. No amount 
of public diplomacy apparently can dispel the notion, 
widely spread in the US, that the September 11 ter-
rorists came through Canada. 
In foreign policy terms, Canada and the United 
States have seldom been less like-minded. The decision 
not to join the coalition in Iraq and the decision not to 
be part of the development of the Missile Defence 
Scheme, come after years of disagreement over other 
issues like the landmines treaty and the ICC. It is true 
that the second Bush term has shown a considerable 
desire on the part of Washington to smooth over 
many of these differences. But the concern over a real 
parting of ways has been planted in the Canadian 
psyche and is not easier to put to rest for the obvious 
fact that Canada’s security and prosperity cannot be 
separated from that of the US. 
For most Canadians, the growing influence of the 
Hispanics in the United States and the fact that the 
centre of gravity is steadily moving southwards and 
westwards mean the relative loss of influence of the 
region they know best and identify most easily with 
i.e. the north-east. When George W. Bush was elected 
the first time, Canadians were shocked to discover an 
American President who was, in many respects, closer 
to Mexico than to Canada. 
Domestic Trends 
Before most other western countries, Canada decided 
to rein in its public finances. Within five years, in the 
mid-nineties, it went from being the worst to being 
the best economic performer in the G-8: A consider-
able achievement which has led, however, to below-
acceptable levels of spending for defence, aid, and 
foreign policy. For years now, Canada has been gen-
erating huge budget surpluses that give it the means 
to pursue new ambitions. But the ability of generating 
new ambitions and investing in the means to achieve 
them is increasingly circumscribed by a disaggrega-
tion of foreign policy decision-making. 
Fast-growing and well-organized immigrant com-
munities are exerting growing pressure on the govern-
ment to act in their countries or regions of origin. 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), particularly 
those with an environment or a human rights agenda 
have also found their way to the heart of foreign 
policy making in Canada. Provinces insist more and 
more on defending their own interests in bilateral 
relations as well as in multilateral forums. The busi-
ness community is pursuing, quite forcefully, a for-
eign policy agenda of its own which is essentially 
focussed on the promotion of further North-American 
integration. 
There are also new fault-lines opening up in foreign 
policy debates, particularly obvious in the relationship 
to the US. 
Quebec used to be among those Canadian provinces 
most favourable to the United States. Partly because 
of the natural protection of the linguistic barrier, 
Quebecers never felt threatened by a closer relation-
ship with the US. Without the enthusiastic support 
of Quebec, a Free Trade Agreement with the US would 
not have been signed in 1989. 
Things now seem to have changed. Many consider 
that Quebec played a key role in the decision not to 
go to Iraq and not to take part in Missile Defence. On 
both issues, opposition in Quebec was well over 80 per 
cent while public opinion in the rest of the country 
was more evenly divided. 
Strong pro-American attitudes are now to be found 
in the Western part of Canada, in particular in the oil-
rich province of Alberta. There, even if it is not hap-
pening on the same scale as in the US, one can witness 
the shift to the right end of the political spectrum 
and the return of religious and socially-conservative 
values. Whether this could spread to other parts of 
the country is an open question but, for now, evidence 
would seem to suggest that it is not likely to be the 
case. Despite the movement in Quebec in one direc-
tion and the movement in Alberta in the opposite 
direction, the centre of gravity in Canada has not yet 
been significantly altered. 
What is, on the other hand, quite striking is a sort 
of schizophrenia that was always there but that is 
becoming more acute. Canadians want to oppose 
American influence within Canada and in the world 
but at the same time they are keen to protect and 
develop their economic ties with the US—something 
Europeans could probably bring themselves to under-
stand. 
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In these conditions of diffusion and contradiction 
the debate on values versus interests in foreign policy 
has become more intense. This debate takes place 
presumably in most countries but in Canada it 
acquires dramatic proportions because in the minds 
of a majority of Canadians, a values-based foreign 
policy is as a major element of national identity 
(together with the universal public health system!). 
Underlying it is again the relationship with the big 
neighbour to the South. An interests-based foreign 
policy is now defined by those who promote it, as a 
foreign policy focussed on improving the relationship 
with the US. It is portrayed as the only realistic foreign 
policy as opposed to an idealistic, values-based policy 
which calls for broader international engagement and 
which is bound to bring the country on a collision 
course with the US. The irony of wanting to pursue an 
interests-based foreign policy vis à vis a country that 
has seldom been more values-driven is interesting in 
itself. 
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Options for Canada 
 
Given the external and domestic trends described 
above, what are the options available to Canada at 
this juncture? 
1.  The Continental Option 
Given the degree of economic integration that already 
exists as a result of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and given the universal trend 
towards greater regional integration described above, 
the continental option would seem an obvious one 
for Canada to pursue. Yet this route will not be easily 
travelled. A strategy which leads to a more intimate 
relationship with the US still generates considerable 
angst in Canada. The “sleeping with an elephant 
syndrome,” famously coined by former Prime Minister 
Lester Pearson, is not about to be easily overcome at a 
time when the divergences in social values and in 
foreign policies have seldom been greater. 
There are, however, strong arguments in favour of 
greater North-American integration, the economic 
arguments being by far the strongest. The Canada–US 
bilateral trade relationship is already the most impor-
tant trade relationship in the world and the growth 
potential with Mexico is very real. Some form of eco-
nomic union would, furthermore, increase the ability 
of all three North American countries to face the chal-
lenges of globalisation and deal more effectively with 
the emergence of very strong new players on the inter-
national scene. 
The Canadians, not unlike the Europeans, believe 
that they can pursue closer economic ties with the 
US while retaining their full freedom to disagree on 
political issues. Experience, past and recent, would 
tend to confirm them in that view. 
The fundamental question is whether greater in-
stitutional integration in any way limits that freedom. 
Doing business with one another is one thing, sharing 
a common external tariff or sharing common stan-
dards may prove to be the beginning of something 
else. The European example is instructive in this 
respect. So far, decades of economic integration have 
not prevented Europeans from having diverging 
foreign policies, as the war in Iraq has shown. How 
many such examples are there however? Convergence 
of foreign policies is happening, even without the new 
European treaty, if it is ever adopted. 
In the minds of the most integrationists of Cana-
dians, there is, for the time being, no vision of an EU 
type integration. Taking a first step in that direction 
could already prove very divisive. Any Canadian gov-
ernment would want to tread very carefully. 
When Canadians discuss the desirability of further 
North-American integration they tend to assume that 
this would be of equal or even greater interest to their 
partners. While this may well be true of Mexico (Presi-
dent Fox has often spoken along those lines), it may 
not be so true in the case of the United States. Annoy-
ance with their northern neighbour’s self-righteous-
ness is growing and if, one day, continental economic 
integration is seen as an objective worth pursuing, 
the list of truly negotiable issues may prove to be quite 
short. 
2.  Less Multilateralism 
Multilateralism, in Canada, is almost genetic. On the 
international scene, the country only really came of 
age after World War II, at a time when most multi-
lateral institutions were being put in place. Canada 
made specific contributions which have marked the 
collective psyche of Canadians forever (e.g. Lester B. 
Pearson on Peacekeeping or John Humphreys on 
Human Rights). Canada had found a niche for itself in 
the multilateral world, a niche it has never deserted. 
Given the current problems in the multilateral 
world (the slow pace of reform, the lack of engage-
ment of most Member States, except in the pursuit of 
narrow national interests and the ambivalence of the 
present American Administration towards the United 
Nations Organisation) Canada could take another 
look at its long-standing commitment to multilateral-
ism and explore other means of achieving its foreign 
policy objectives. As we will see under Option 3 and 4 
that is happening to some degree but a radical change 
of orientation seems unlikely. 
Canada has been the successful promoter of many 
initiatives and of many new legal instruments and has 
3.  The Bilateralisation of Foreign Policy 
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never made any mystery of the fact that, as a middle-
size open and vulnerable country, it had perhaps a 
bigger stake than most in an international rules-based 
system. Even in a less than multilateral-friendly 
environment, Canada was able in recent years to find 
partners and pursue successfully objectives like the 
landmines treaty, the ICC or the “Responsibility to 
Protect” agenda. The long-standing commitment to 
multilateralism, therefore, is likely to be maintained. 
3.  The Bilateralisation of Foreign Policy 
Given the emphasis Canada has placed up until now 
on multilateral channels and on its membership in 
regional forums to achieve its foreign policy objec-
tives, significant bilateral relationships are relatively 
few and under-developed. The one big exception is of 
course its relationship to the US. Even there, some 
would argue that that relationship could and should 
be managed quite differently, in particular by linking 
issues rather than trying to solve them all separately. 
Long-lasting trade disputes over soft-wood lumber 
or beef exports have, in recent times, made Canadians 
wonder whether, under the present circumstances, 
such issues can really be handled more effectively. The 
question raised is whether Canada should not explore 
actively means of reducing its dependence on the 
American market, home to 85 per cent of Canadian 
exports. 
Back in the early seventies, Canada had already 
recognized the need to diversify and strengthen its 
bilateral relationships. Known as the Third Option, 
this diversification policy did not however yield the 
expected results. For instance, the so-called Contrac-
tual Link negotiated with the European Community 
did not produce the growth in bilateral trade that had 
been expected. 35 years later a new attempt is now 
being made to negotiate a Canada–EU Trade and In-
vestment Enhancement Agreement. 
The history of Canada’s relationship with Europe 
is one of unfulfilled expectations on the part of Cana-
dians and mostly benevolent indifference on the part 
of Europeans. While it is often acknowledged that 
Canada stands close to Europe on a wide range of 
policy issues (stretching from publicly funded social 
programmes to environment protection and foreign 
policy) and would be a more natural member of the 
EU than some of the current members, none of this is 
easily translated into close and effective cooperation. 
Quite on the contrary: Canada is hardly on the radar 
screens of Europeans. To many Canadians Europe 
is part of their history; their future lies elsewhere. 
Latin America was discovered only in the mid-
eighties. Canada then became a member of the OAS 
and successfully promoted within that organisation a 
strong democratic development agenda. In the nine-
ties, the emphasis in Canada’s policy towards Latin 
America shifted to the promotion of a Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA). This initiative has since lost 
much of its momentum, as Brazil is pursuing, with 
Mercosur, a different agenda altogether. The interest-
ing point is that in both instances Canada used multi-
lateral initiatives to develop its links to South 
America. A bilateralisation of its relations with the 
countries of the continent was not and is still not the 
order of the day. 
With Asia, Canada is, like all big exporting coun-
tries, fully aware of the fact that the growth potential 
is there more than anywhere else. Efforts are now 
being made to develop special bilateral ties with some 
countries like India. A trade and science and tech-
nology cooperation agreement has recently been 
signed with India. For a long time already Canada has 
tried to develop a broad agenda with Japan and China. 
Yet these efforts have all produced no more than 
modest results: the breadth and depth of the bilateral 
relationship with the US dwarfs all other bilateral re-
lations. In order to pursue an ambitious and success-
ful bilateral agenda Canada would have to learn to 
play its hand from a position of strength. Its natural 
resources represent, in this day and age, tremendous 
assets that need to be exploited differently in dealing 
with energy hungry and fresh-water thirsty countries. 
A proposition which already sounds very un-Canadian! 
Yet, China’s clearly stated interest in the Canadian 
mining industry and in the Canadian oil sands should 
make the country more self-confident in its dealings 
not only with China but with many other countries, 
including the US. 
4.  New Multilateral Tools  
If the continental horizon is too narrow (and uncom-
fortable), if multilateral channels are unlikely to serve 
Canadian foreign policy objectives as well as they used 
to and if bilateralisation is a skill that still needs to be 
acquired, there is one other option that the current 
Prime Minister of Canada has been focussing on for 
some time, the creation of a new forum. When he was 
Canada’s Finance Minister he was able to convince his 
Options for Canada 
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colleagues in the World Bank and in the International 
Monetary Fund to set up a Group of Twenty (G-20), 
which brings together the countries of the G-8 and key 
emerging and regional centres of economic power. 
Together, the members of the G-20 represent 90 per 
cent of the world’s economic power, 75 per cent of all 
trade and 70 per cent of the world’s population. Set up 
to prevent financial crises of the kind that plagued 
South American and Asian countries in the nineties, 
the Group has worked remarkably well and has gone 
beyond the management of crises to the development 
of common principles for sound economic manage-
ment. 
An L-20 (Leaders 20) would bring together the heads 
of government of more or less the same group of coun-
tries but would have broader political objectives. It 
addresses, at least partially, the problem of the lack of 
legitimacy of the G-8. It is also a forum meant, at least 
theoretically, to support rather than weaken existing 
multilateral institutions. It is not conceived as an 
alternative to existing multilateral universal insti-
tutions such as the United Nations Organisation but 
rather as a forum that could provide “a jolt of political 
energy” to those bodies, to quote the Canadian Prime 
Minister—a role which the G-20 plays quite effectively 
for the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. 
The creation of such a forum is of obvious interest 
to Canada. For a country anxious to maintain its inter-
national out-reach at a time when exclusive regional 
entities are developing in all parts of the world, and 
aware of the fact that its relative importance in the 
world is diminishing as a result of the emergence of 
big new players, a G-20 is a very attractive proposal 
indeed. 
Other G-8 countries are more circumspect because 
they do not share some of Canada’s concerns. They 
are either big players themselves or they belong to a 
strong regional entity, the EU. Yet L-20 is of real in-
terest to all actual or aspiring regional powers. They 
see their membership in that club as a confirmation of 
their regional influence. Some of them may even be 
inclined to see it as the first expression of a multipolar 
world in the making. 
Unsurprisingly, in its most recent foreign policy 
review, Canada did not choose among these options. 
In some form or other, it went for all four. The 
International Policy Statement (IPS), published in 
April1 and immodestly entitled “A Role of Pride and 
 
1  Vgl. <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-en.asp>. 
Influence in the World,” calls for both a strengthened 
North American Partnership and an activist inter-
national agenda. It states that Canada will lead the 
diplomatic efforts to create an L-20 and it vows to 
develop new bilateral strategies with key regional 
players. Specifically mentioned countries are South 
Africa, Jordan, Mexico, South Korea, India, Brazil, 
and China. 
The North American Agenda is aimed at promoting 
continental security and prosperity, the international 
one at making a difference globally. The latter, alone, 
lists 13 priorities and 46 initiatives which cover all 
areas, from international security to trade and invest-
ment, from development assistance to the full range 
of global issues. The Canadian government renews 
its strong commitment to multilateralism but does 
lay the emphasis on the urgent need for reform. The 
IPS concludes with an undertaking to involve all 
Canadians, all levels of government and all institu-
tions of civil society (NGOs, business, and labour) in 
the making and delivery of Canada’s foreign policy. 
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Canada, the US, and Europe 
 
Canada has clearly tried to adapt its foreign policy to 
the new and changing circumstances on the inter-
national as well as on the domestic scenes. Has it, how-
ever, come any closer to solving its long-standing for-
eign policy dilemmas? 
Vis-à-vis the US, has Canada found a way to be both 
close enough and far enough? Has it made a choice 
between a values-driven and an interests-driven for-
eign policy? Has it decided that its influence in 
Washington and in the world can actually grow at 
the same time? 
The IPS can only be read as the latest compromise 
between all these conflicting objectives. 
On the first dilemma, the decision made this time 
is to move somewhat closer to the US. The over-
whelming importance of the US is clearly stated, as 
is the need to better manage that relationship. In 
the definition of priorities and initiatives, however, 
the emphasis is placed, interestingly, not on the 
bilateral relationship but rather on the revitalization 
of the North American Partnership. An attempt at 
trilateralisation that does not quite hide the fact that, 
in reality, the North American Partnership is essen-
tially the addition of three bilateral relationships 
(including a weak one, the Canada–Mexico axis) but 
it serves the purpose of showing Canadians that the 
new policy is not primarily about moving closer to 
the US. As always, the real test of whether the right 
balance has been struck will come if and when public 
support is sought for specific continental integration 
initiatives. 
On the second dilemma, it can be argued that 
values have faired better than expected. A foreign 
policy that puts so much emphasis on North America, 
on economic growth and on the development of a 
new set of bilateral relations could be assumed to be 
mainly interests-driven. The very ambitious multi-
lateral agenda confirms, however, that on that front 
there is more continuity than change in the Canadian 
foreign policy, as far as being mainly values-driven is 
concerned. 
On the third dilemma, one can see that a conscious 
effort was made to solve that dilemma altogether. 
Canada should have a non-confrontational relation-
ship with the US and with that, gain influence in 
Washington. At the same time, it should gain in-
fluence in the world through sustained multilateral 
engagement and through the pursuit of a new set of 
bilateral relationships with emerging countries. That 
ambition is captured in the title of the IPS “A Role of 
Pride and Influence in the World.” There again, only 
time will tell whether this is achievable. 
Until now, Canada’s visibility in the world has 
always been at its highest when Ottawa disagreed with 
Washington. The world knows about Canada’s stance 
on Cuba, on the Vietnam War, on the war in Iraq and 
on Missile Defence. In most parts of the world this has 
earned Canada credit and respect. Influence? Perhaps 
not to the extent that one would have expected or 
hoped for. Will a measure of continental integration 
leave Canada with the same capacity and inclination 
to disagree with the United States when visions do 
not coincide? Can Canada develop strong ties with 
emerging countries, promote an L-20 and avoid the 
collision course with Washington—Canada as the 
go-between? If such a role can be played and if Canada 
is particularly apt at playing it, one wonders why, in 
recent years, Canada did not play more of a bridging 
role in the transatlantic divide. By comparison, that 
would have been a minor challenge. 
 
Is any of this of relevance to Europeans? 
Because of real and acknowledged similarities 
between Canada and Europe on many foreign and 
domestic policy issues, Canada has sometimes been 
referred to as “a North American country with Euro-
pean instincts.” Does that mean that, in comparison 
to the US, the transatlantic cooperation between 
Canada and Europe is less problematic and goes on 
unnurtured? No evidence points in that direction. 
Years of very significant Canadian involvement in 
the Balkans and major contributions in Afghanistan 
alongside European troops have not been enough to 
make Europeans aware of the need to address the 
unique situation of Canada, for instance in NATO. 
Canada is neither the US nor an aspiring EU member 
so it does not readily fit in any great scheme to 
strengthen the European identity or to re-calibre the 
transatlantic relationship. Is Canada, for its part, 
making enough of an effort to shape the future of its 
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relationship with Europe, inside as well as outside 
NATO? Probably not. The question, therefore, is why 
should either side do what it does not seem naturally 
inclined to do, i.e. defend and promote a special 
relationship? 
Europeans should perhaps be more conscious of 
the fact that reliable, like-minded, multilateralist part-
ners with enough resources and political will to make 
a contribution, do no come in such numbers that 
Canada can be mostly ignored. 
Canadians, on the other hand, who do not share 
the view that Canada’s future lies in ever growing 
North American integration, have the duty to ensure 
that Canada’s ties to the rest of the world remain 
strong. The momentum now is behind the develop-
ment of new relations with emerging countries. It is 
again incumbent upon those who believe that the link 
to Europe is not only part of history to preserve it. It 
should be seen as being part of any game plan to make 
a difference in the world. President Bush has clearly 
acknowledged that during his visit to Europe last 
February. Canadians should not be lagging behind. 
The most obvious first step would be a better in-
clusion of Canada in the transatlantic dialogue. 
For that to happen, Canada would have to define 
convincingly the nature of its added value. It would 
also have to find within Europe a champion. Could 
this be Germany? 
Abbreviations 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations 
EU European Union 
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas 
G-8 Group of Eight (Group of Seven + Russia) 
G-20 Group of Twenty 
ICC International Criminal Court 
IPS International Policy Statement 
L-20 The leaders (heads of government) of 20 states 
Mercosur Mercado Común del Sur 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
OAS Organization of American States 
OAU Organization of African Unity 
